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ARTICLE
The 2020 regional elections in Italy: sub-national politics in 
the year of the pandemic
Davide Vampa
College of Business and Social Sciences, Aston University, Birmingham, UK
ABSTRACT
This article focuses on eight regional elections held in Italy in 2020, 
the year of the Coronavirus pandemic. It looks at both the January 
and September rounds. Even though these two sets of elections 
took place, respectively, at the end and at the beginning of two 
distinctive ‘phases’, separated by the Covid-19 outbreak, they share 
some important characteristics. The discussion starts from a short 
overview of the events leading to the polling days, looking in 
particular at pre-election coalition building, the electoral cam-
paigns and the positioning of key leaders. It then moves onto the 
analysis of the election results. It considers changes in political 
participation, support for the major parties, the strengthening of 
local and non-partisan lists, volatility and shifts in political repre-
sentation. The overall pattern is one of increasing territorial com-
plexity and fragmentation: regional elections now clearly follow 
a logic of their own, dominated more by local leaders than by 
national parties.
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There is little doubt that 2020 has been a watershed in world politics. Italy was one of the 
epicentres of a global earthquake and became the first major European country to 
experience the dramatic (and traumatic) effects of the Coronavirus pandemic. Since 
the end of February 2020, the Coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19), has dominated 
Italian political debate. Terms like ‘test’, ‘mask’, ‘social distancing’, ‘lockdown’ and 
‘quarantine’ soon became part of the mainstream political vocabulary. This was certainly 
a sudden and unexpected turn of events. In retrospect, not even the crisis hitting the 
Italian economy between 2008 and 2011, which had been widely regarded as a systemic 
shock, had led to a similarly dramatic transformation in political dynamics and dis-
courses. Between March and June Italian politics was de facto frozen, suspended, over-
whelmed by the emergency. At the start of 2020, political commentators could not have 
predicted that they would spend the whole spring counting the thousands of deaths 
caused by Covid-19 instead of analysing the votes cast by millions of citizens in the main 
electoral test of the year: the 2020 regional elections.
Nine of the twenty Italian regions were expected to go to the polls between January 
and April. In the end, only two regional elections, in Emilia-Romagna and Calabria, took 
place on the planned date, 26 January. They were supposed to be a sort of ‘general 
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rehearsal’ before a more extensive round of local and regional elections in April. Yet they 
ended up being the last major political event of the pre-Coronavirus era. The other 
regional elections would be postponed to the end of September, once the first wave of the 
pandemic had subsided (and shortly before the start of the second wave). However, 
although these two sets of elections took place, respectively, at the end and at the 
beginning of two different phases, they share some important characteristics. The 
January elections marked the end of the four-year winning streak of Salvini’s new Lega 
(League) and this was confirmed in September. At the same time, both electoral rounds 
were affected by the rise of another right-wing competitor: Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli 
d’Italia (Brothers of Italy, FdI) (see also the article by Albertazzi, Bonansinga and 
Zulianello in this special issue). On the other hand, the other winner of the 2018 general 
elections, the Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five-star Movement, M5s), experienced an 
important electoral setback at the beginning of 2020, which would be even more evident 
eight months later. The elections also saw the re-emergence of a clearly ‘bipolar’ dynamic 
between centre-left and centre-right coalitions. Tighter competition between two 
opposed fronts was also accompanied by an increase in electoral participation, after 
years of decline. Yet the ‘bipolarization’ of competition was not clearly driven by national 
party strategies. In fact, populists’ attempts at ‘nationalizing’ regional campaigns and 
transforming them into referendums on the government, which initially triggered 
a cross-regional, anti-populist response (i.e. the movement of the so-called ‘Sardines’: 
see the article by Caruso and De Blasio in this special issue), clearly failed. Regional issues 
and regional candidates played a central role – much more important than in the past – 
in determining electoral dynamics and outcomes in both pre- and post-Coronavirus 
rounds. This points to the increasing ‘insulation’ of the regional dimension of politics 
from national debates (and vice-versa), which is not surprising given the ambiguous 
political orientation of the government (and its leadership) in Rome. Overall, it seems 
that the pandemic merely accelerated trends that were already visible at the beginning of 
the year and, in some cases, had started well before 2020.
This article focuses on eight of the nine regional elections held in 2020 – the election in 
the small Valle d’Aosta has been excluded due to the peculiar political and institutional 
characteristics of this region. The discussion starts from a short overview of the events 
leading to the polling days, looking in particular at pre-election coalition building, the 
electoral campaigns and the positioning of key leaders. It then moves to the analysis of 
the electoral results. It considers changes in political participation, support for the major 
parties, the strengthening of local and non-partisan lists, volatility and shifts in political 
representation. The overall pattern is one of increasing territorial complexity and frag-
mentation: regional elections now clearly follow a logic of their own, dominated more by 
local leaders than national parties.
Coalitions and electoral campaigns: an overview
Following the transition to the so-called Second Republic in the early 1990s, regional 
elections in Italy seemed to be largely subordinate to national-level politics. This was 
already clear in 1995, when they served as an opportunity to launch a new centre-left 
alliance between post-Communists and former Christian Democrats, which would then 
win the 1996 general election. In 2000, regional elections anticipated the result of the 
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2001 general election, which saw the victory of a renewed centre-right coalition including 
both Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (Forward Italy, FI) and Umberto Bossi’s Lega Nord 
(Northern League, LN). In 2005, the opposite happened: centre-left coalitions won in 
almost all regions and this preceded a change in national government in 2006. In 2010, 
dynamics were slightly more complex but still dominated by competition between 
opponents and supporters of the national government, which at that time was led, 
once again, by Berlusconi. This regular pattern of interactions between national ruling 
and opposition parties, which may be linked to the ‘second order’ nature of regional 
elections (Schakel and Jeffery 2013), no longer seemed to hold in 2015. This turned out to 
be the culmination of a ‘critical’ election cycle (Bolgherini and Grimaldi 2017) in which 
regional party systems had become more fragmented and volatile than in the past 
(Vampa 2015). To be sure, this was partly due to the fact that regional political competi-
tion had become more ‘region-centred’ (Bolgherini and Grimaldi 2017, 487), less domi-
nated by national parties and leaders and more subject to region-specific factors than in 
the 1990s and early 2000s. This may also be explained by the fact that, due to a number of 
early elections – in some cases triggered by investigations and arrests involving regional 
politicians – the 15 ‘ordinary statute’ regions no longer went to the polls simultaneously – 
as was the case until the early 2000s. At the same time, however, the growing instability of 
sub-national party politics was similar to that observed at the national level. After all, 
what was happening in the sub-national electoral arena reflected the deep de-structuring 
and re-structuring processes investing the Italian party system in its entirety after the 
financial crisis and Great Recession (Karremans, Malet, and Morisi 2019).
At the beginning of 2020, one political actor in particular tried to ‘re-nationalize’ the 
political debate in regional election campaigns: Matteo Salvini. Paradoxically, this was the 
leader of a party that used to place particular emphasis on the regional political dimen-
sion and its autonomy. Yet Salvini’s League had long ceased to be a regionalist party 
mostly concerned with federalism and decentralization and had become a ‘state-wide’ 
radical right populist party focusing on ‘nativist nationalism’ (Albertazzi, Giovannini, 
and Seddone 2018). The regional election in Emilia-Romagna was especially regarded by 
the leader of the League as an opportunity to re-launch his political project after his 
attempt to force an early general election in the summer of 2019 had failed. Salvini’s exit 
from national government had led to the creation of a new executive, still led by Giuseppe 
Conte, but including the former opposition, the Partito Democratico (Democratic Party, 
PD), now allied with the M5s. This had probably been the first serious setback suffered by 
Salvini since his election as leader of the League and, as suggested by various opinion 
polls, had resulted in a sharp decline in his popularity rating (see Albertazzi, Bonansinga 
and Zulianello in this special issue).1
Winning the regional election in Emilia-Romagna, a historical stronghold of the Left, 
would therefore prove that the new Conte government was lacking political legitimacy 
and that the League’s calls for new elections were resonating with the wider electorate. In 
fact, already at the end of 2019, a League-dominated right-wing coalition had managed to 
defeat an alliance between the PD and the M5s in Umbria, where a corruption scandal 
involving the PD-led administration had triggered an early election. Umbria was also 
part of the so-called ‘red-belt’ (Barbieri 2012), that is, the group of central Italian regions 
where centre-left coalitions had been electorally dominant for decades. Yet Umbria is 
a relatively small and peripheral region, which carries much less political weight than 
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Emilia-Romagna. By winning in the latter region, Salvini sought to deal the final blow to 
the national government. In sum, he adopted an electoral logic that saw the regional 
dimension as subordinate to his national strategy.
The response of the opposite front was quite different. Unlike in Umbria, where, for 
the first time, an electoral alliance between the PD and the M5s had been formed without 
much success, in Emilia-Romagna negotiations between the two parties failed. After the 
defeat in Umbria, the M5s was much less willing to replicate the same experience in other 
regions. At the same time, the PD – gripped by the ‘great fear’ of losing one of its last 
strongholds (Ramella and Bosco 2020) – had fewer incentives to build a renewed coali-
tion and distance itself from the incumbent administration. While in Umbria the PD-led 
government had clearly disappointed voters, in Emilia-Romagna the incumbent presi-
dent, Stefano Bonaccini, could point to the creditable record of centre-left government in 
the region. Generally, the PD built a campaign focused on regional issues and buongo-
verno (good government), avoiding references to the national executive where the party 
had to share power with the M5s, which remained an awkward ally for many PD activists 
and supporters. Therefore, it largely ignored Salvini’s attempts to draw attention to the 
limits of the Conte government and, more generally, to national issues, especially 
immigration and law and order (areas in which regions have little power).
However, while the PD refused to be involved in a nationally focused campaign pitting 
populists against anti-populists, a spontaneous movement emerged outside the perimeter 
of the ‘official’ centre-left coalition. The mobilization of the so-called Sardine (Sardines: 
see Caruso and De Blasio in this special issue) – groups of largely young, progressive 
citizens denouncing the radical stances of right-wing populists – sought openly to oppose 
Salvini and ‘Salvinismo’. Newell (2020) aptly defined them as ‘a movement of protest 
against populist politics’. By expressing their support for a (relatively broad) set of 
political values, rather than specific policy issues, the Sardines’ campaign soon assumed 
national relevance and went beyond Emilia-Romagna. The ‘red’ region was mainly 
regarded as the symbol of a political tradition, which was being threatened by the 
national (and international) rise of the far right.
It is unclear whether the mobilization of the Sardines played a decisive role in the 
victory of the PD in Emilia-Romagna – the ‘great fear’ did not materialize and Bonaccini 
was confirmed president of the region (see below). The movement was certainly not as 
vocal in the other region that voted in January, Calabria, which attracted much less 
‘national’ attention (Mete 2020). In the end, despite ‘undergoing explosive growth’ 
(Newell 2020, 2) and attracting significant national attention, the Sardines’ project 
would become one of the first political victims of the pandemic. In the period following 
the first wave of Covid-19, little remained of a movement based on a loose network of 
grassroots groups, whose mobilization had been manly symbolized by large rallies (no 
longer an option in an age of social distancing).
Thus, Salvini’s defeat and the premature collapse of the Sardines highlighted the 
weakness of ‘nationalizing’ pressures even before the Covid-19 outbreak. In fact, de- 
nationalizing tendencies seemed to have a more structural and lasting impact on the 
regional arena. In January, Bonaccini’s personality and a range of region-specific issues 
had emerged as key assets for the PD in Emilia-Romagna. After the pandemic, a similar 
story, in rather different contexts, occurred in Campania and Puglia, where the elections 
were dominated by the incumbent PD presidents: Vincenzo de Luca and Michele 
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Emiliano. Interestingly, this phenomenon of region-centred ‘presidentialization’ also 
invested two regions governed by the right: Liguria and Veneto, led by Giovanni Toti 
and Luca Zaia. Of course, regional voting systems based on direct election of the leaders 
of the executives had already contributed to strengthening presidential candidates vis-à– 
vis political parties over the previous two decades (Grimaldi and Vercesi 2018). Yet the 
pandemic, putting pressure on regionalized health systems, added more importance to 
the role played by regional presidents and this, in turn, shifted the political focus further 
away from national competition.
The separation between different territorial levels was also facilitated by the absence of 
a clear political target in Rome. The coalition in national government was not recreated at 
the regional level. The PD and the M5s formed an alliance only in Liguria (with little 
success), while they ran separately in all the other regions. Hence, it was quite difficult to 
frame the regional elections in the same way as in previous years – that is, as a clear 
contest between parties in national government and parties in opposition. Even in 2015, 
the then Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi, had intervened constantly in the campaign to 
support PD candidates, whose success would in turn strengthen his government. This did 
not happen in 2020, when Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte avoided any direct involve-
ment in the election. Indeed, any explicit endorsement of a PD or M5s candidate would 
have provoked tensions between the two parties. To be sure, compared to the previous 
election round of 2014–2015, in 2020 competition between coalitions was based more on 
what, at first sight, may appear as a classic dynamic of centre-left versus centre-right 
political blocs. Yet the nature and characteristics of these centre-left and centre-right 
coalitions varied from region to region and were more influenced by regional leaders – 
around whom alliances between parties and groups were built – than by national 
cleavages and state-wide dimensions of competition.
The rising number of non-partisan or local lists competing at the regional level is 
a clear sign of the increasing centrality of regional candidates and the simultaneous 
decline of state-wide parties in the sub-national electoral arena (Vampa 2015, 2016). This 
used to be a rather marginal phenomenon in regional elections. Yet, starting from the 
2014/2015 round, we can observe a proliferation of groups and movements that cannot 
be clearly identified with the parties dominating national politics – across the eight 
regions they increased from 15 in 2010 to 37 in 2014/2015 to 59 in 2020. Often these 
are lists created by representatives of what is widely referred to as ‘civil society’, who are 
not affiliated to any party but declare their allegiance to a candidate for president. In 
2020, all presidents elected in the eight regions enjoyed the support of at least one of these 
lists. In some cases – Veneto, Liguria, Campania and Puglia – ‘presidents’ lists’ even 
outweighed traditional parties in political influence and electoral strength (see next 
section). They were used by regional leaders not only to broaden the perimeters of 
their coalitions, but also to free themselves from the strategic and programmatic con-
straints imposed by parties to which, formally, they still belonged and were accountable.
Luca Zaia is a clear example of this process of shifting political weight from centre to 
region. In 2010, he had left his position as national Minister of Agriculture in the last 
Berlusconi government and had been elected president of Veneto with the support of 
only three national parties – his party, the LN, being the strongest one. Yet in 2015, he 
created his ‘personal’ list, which would become the largest political group of the region 
(see next section) and allowed him to govern Veneto autonomously from the national 
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leadership of his party. Giovanni Toti is an even more striking case of an emerging 
regional personality. In 2015, he had been parachuted into Liguria by Silvio Berlusconi 
and had unexpectedly won the election. In the years following he gradually distanced 
himself from the leader of FI and in 2020 he even created his own list – Cambiamo con 
Toti Presidente (‘Let us change, with Toti as President’) – which would win more votes 
than any of the other parties of the centre-right coalition supporting him. In sum, in 2020 
incumbent presidents, and presidential candidates more generally, played a key role in 
structuring sub-national electoral competition. One may even say that, rather than 
nationalizing regional campaigns, these increasingly powerful actors helped to regiona-
lize national politics.
Participation and electoral results
Despite its challenges, 2020 can be regarded as a positive year for citizens’ electoral 
participation. A significant increase in voter turnout, compared to the previous electoral 
cycle, could already be observed in January. In Emilia-Romagna, for instance, turnout 
increased by 30 percentage points. This trend continued in September, in spite of the 
pandemic and the unusual time of year for the holding of elections. Overall, 2020 marked 
a clear reversal in the long-term decline in electoral participation at the regional level, 
which had reached its lowest point in the 2014/2015 cycle – when overall turnout fell 
below 50% for the first time. Of course, in 2020 a constitutional referendum on the 
reduction in the number of MPs was held on the same day as the September elections and 
might have attracted more voters. However, there had been no constitutional referendum 
in Emilia-Romagna in January and, still, electoral participation had already skyrocketed 
then. The data included in Table 1 show that, together with Emilia-Romagna, two other 
regions, Tuscany and Marche, enjoyed the most significant bounce back in turnout. This 
might be explained by how competitive the electoral process had become there.
Until 2015, the three regions had been clearly dominated by centre-left coalitions and, 
in fact, the gap between the centre left and its strongest competitor had even increased in 
2014/2015. In 2020, in contrast, the regional elections in Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna 
became much tighter. The right-hand side of Table 2 (section B) clearly shows this. In 
Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna, centre-left coalitions basically held their share of the vote. 
What brought a radical change in political equilibria was the dramatic increase in support 
for the centre-right coalitions. This resulted in a relatively narrow gap between winner 
Table 1. Turnout in regional elections from 1990 to 2020 (percentages).
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
2014/ 
2015 2020 Difference 2020/previous election
Liguria 84.8 79.6 70.5 69.6 60.9 50.7 53.4 2.7
Veneto 90.8 85.2 75.6 72.4 66.4 57.1 61.1 4
Tuscany 89.6 85.2 74.6 71.4 60.7 48.8 62.6 13.8
Marche 89.5 84.6 74.3 71.5 62.8 49.8 59.7 9.9
Campania 81.2 73.9 69.5 67.7 63 51.9 55.5 3.6
Puglia 84.3 75.7 70.2 70.5 63.2 51.2 56.4 5.2
Emilia-Romagna 93 88.3 79.7 76.7 68.1 37.7 67.7 30
Calabria 75.8 68.6 64.6 64.4 59.3 44.1 44.3 0.2
Total 86.5 80.3 72.8 70.8 63.6 49.4 58.5 9.1
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and loser (narrower than in most other regions), thus making inter-coalition politics in 
Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna much more competitive. In the Marche region, the centre- 
left coalition remained more or less stable, while the centre-right camp – which in 2015 
had been split into two coalitions – surged by around 30 percentage points, thus flipping 
the region for the first time since the mid-1990s. The increased electoral ‘vulnerability’ of 
the red regions may therefore explain the shift in voters’ mobilization observed in Table 
1. This was also driven by strong appeals, aimed particularly at left-wing voters, to cast 
a voto utile (a ‘useful vote’), i.e. not to ‘waste their votes’ by casting them for third-party 
candidates. This was particularly effective in Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany, while less 
successful in the Marche, where disillusionment with the left seemed to prevail and 
a similar dynamic to that of neighbouring Umbria could be observed. Among the other 
regions, only Puglia had a similar narrow gap between coalitions – and it is perhaps no 
coincidence that this is the region that experienced the largest increase in turnout in the 
South.
Instead, huge gaps between coalitions emerged in Liguria, Veneto, Campania and 
Calabria. In the first three regions, this was a clear sign of consolidation of the incumbent 
administrations and incumbent presidents, who played a key role in rallying voters and 
expanding the electoral support of their coalitions. Calabria, however, confirmed the 
highly volatile and unstable nature of its politics. Since 1995, this region has always 
experienced large swings from one coalition to the other.
Considering individual parties (Table 2, section A), the M5s and FI were the clear 
losers of the elections. Both parties saw their electoral support drop by more than half 
and they lost votes in all regions except Calabria. Yet while FI has been in decline for 
years, as shown in Figure 1, the M5s has experienced a much more dramatic and abrupt 
electoral collapse. In the 2018 general election, the M5s was by far the largest party in the 
eight regions, winning more than one third of the vote. In just two years, the Movement 
seems to have almost completely dilapidated its political capital. It is too early to say if 


















PD M5S FI League FdI
Figure 1. Main parties’ electoral results in the eight regions from 2015 to 2020 (percentages). Source: 
Author’s own elaboration based on data from the Italian Ministry of the Interior
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‘anti-system’ party that has been damaged by its own success. Rapid electoral growth, also 
due to the ‘catch-all’ appeal of its ‘eclectic’ or ‘polyvalent’ populism (Mosca and Tronconi 
2019; Pirro 2018), allowed the Movement to seize power in a relatively short period of 
time. This, however, also forced it to reach compromises and forge alliances with very 
different parties, the League in 2018 and the PD in 2019, causing confusion within its 
electorate. The inexperience of its leadership and the lack of a solid organization also 
conspired against the M5s, which failed to play a decisive role in any of the key regional 
contests in 2020.
The Movement decided to run alone in all regions. Liguria was the only exception. 
There an alliance between the M5s and the PD was created but, as in Umbria in 2019, it 
was heavily punished by voters. Generally, the results of the 2020 regional elections 
confirm the crisis of identity and the dilemmas of a populist party-movement that was 
created to break the cartel dominated by traditional centre-left and centre-right coalitions 
but is, in fact, unable to build an alternative to their duopoly without reaching compro-
mises with them. In the end, many M5s supporters, faced with a return to bipolar 
competition, decided not to ‘waste’ their vote, particularly in the red regions. This is 
what happened, for instance, in Emilia-Romagna, where most M5s voters defected from 
the Movement’s official candidate and instead chose Bonaccini’s centre-left coalition 
(Regalia, Valbruzzi, and Vassallo 2020).
The PD too experienced electoral losses compared to the 2014/2015 regional election 
cycle. Yet, despite losing 4.8 percentage points, it won the largest share of the vote in 2020 
(Table 2, section A). This was not an obvious result, since in the previous general and 
European elections the party had lost its position as largest party, having been overtaken 
by the M5s in 2018 and by the League in 2019. Figure 1 suggests that, overall, its electoral 
trajectory has been the most stable over the last five years, crossing that of the M5s and 
the League. On the one hand, this stability may be regarded as a weakness, pointing to the 
inability of the party to appeal to new constituencies and fulfil its ‘majoritarian’ ambi-
tions. On the other hand, considering that the party has experienced various splits and 
has been in an almost continuous state of crisis and ‘soul-searching’ – it also had to 
compete with a wide range of local lists – a result above 20% shows how resilient the PD 
is. So far, no other party or movement has been able to challenge its primacy on the 
centre left.
The League and FdI, the two parties of the populist radical right, have clearly 
expanded their support base in comparison to 2014/2015. Salvini’s League was still 
behind FI in the previous regional elections, but it is now leading the right-wing bloc. 
Yet this is not a novelty of 2020. In fact, the 2020 regional elections marked the end of the 
electoral expansion of the party, which had reached its peak in 2019. Compared to the 
results of the European election in the eight regions analysed here, Salvini’s party has seen 
its share of the vote almost halve. On the other hand, FdI is the only party that has 
continuously grown since 2015, overtaking FI. It has more than doubled its support since 
then and this confirms what most polls have been suggesting since 2019: Giorgia Meloni’s 
party has become a major player in Italian politics and can even aspire to replace the 
League as the leading party of the right (see Albertazzi, Bonansinga and Zulianello in this 
special issue).
One interesting detail emerging from the data in Table 2 concerns the support for the 
League in Liguria and Veneto. In both contexts, Salvini’s party actually won a smaller 
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share of the vote than in 2015 (not to mention 2018 and 2020). Today Salvini’s party is 
stronger in the former red regions of Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany and Marche than in 
Veneto. Part of the losses suffered by the League in Liguria and Veneto can be explained 
by the unprecedented success of the local lists created to support the candidates for 
president. In Liguria Giovanni Toti’s list Cambiamo con Toti Presidente became the 
largest group in the centre-right coalition, overtaking the League, which in 2015 had been 
the leading party of that bloc. In Veneto, Luca Zaia’s personal list had already overtaken 
his own party in 2015 but in 2020 the gap with the League widened from 5 to almost 
28 percentage points. The list Zaia Presidente (‘Zaia for President’) grew from 23.1% of 
the vote to an astonishing 44.6%. Basically in 2020 Zaia no longer needed the votes of the 
League, or any other centre-right party, to win the election. Therefore, the president of 
Veneto, despite formally belonging to Salvini’s party, demonstrated that he was, de facto, 
an autonomous political actor who could do without the support of the national leader-
ship. Presidents’ lists were also quite strong, although more fragmented, in the South. 
Here, they were particularly important for centre-left incumbent presidents in Campania 
and Puglia. Overall, local lists won a quarter of the total vote across the eight regions, thus 
surpassing the share won by the largest party, the PD.
Even though the role played by parties at the sub-national level clearly declined, the 
2020 elections marked a return to a ‘bipolar’ type of competition. Table 3 shows the 
evolution of the ‘bipolarism index’ (Bolgherini and Grimaldi 2017, 495) in the eight 
regions from 1995 to 2020. The index is given by the combined electoral support (as 
a percentage of the total vote) of the largest and second largest coalitions. Thus, the 
higher the value, the more the political system is centred on the competition between two 
coalitions. A score of 100 indicates that there is a ‘duopoly’, meaning that no votes are 
cast outside the two main electoral blocs. The data point to a progressive concentration of 
support for two coalitions from 1995 to 2005. The trend changed in 2010. 2015 saw the 
least bipolar elections in more than two decades. While the two main coalitions together 
won on average 96.3% of the vote at the peak of the ‘bipolarization’ process, in 2015 their 
combined share collapsed to 71.9%. This was largely due to the rise of the M5s but also to 
the fragmentation of the centre-right coalition (running separately in various regions) 
and to the existence of moderately successful candidates of the radical left. The 2020 
elections saw a ‘re-concentration’ of the vote, particularly in Liguria, Veneto, Emilia- 
Romagna and Tuscany, where support for the M5s collapsed. Yet, as already mentioned 
above, this return to bipolarism did not reduce territorial fragmentation. In fact, due to 
the unprecedented success of local lists and the central role played by local candidates, 
Table 3. Level of electoral bipolarism (index of bipolarism, in percentages).
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Liguria 80.4 96.8 99.2 100 62.4 95
Veneto 70.6 93.2 93 89.3 72.8 92.5
Tuscany 86.2 89.4 90.2 94.1 68 89.1
Marche 90.5 94.1 96.3 92.9 62.9 86.4
Campania 87.2 98.4 96 97.3 79.5 87.6
Puglia 95.7 97.5 99 91 65.5 85.7
Emilia-Romagna 85.8 96.8 97.9 88.8 79 95
Calabria 82 98.6 98.7 90 85 85.4
Average 84.8 95.6 96.3 92.9 71.9 89.6
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on data from the Italian Ministry of the Interior
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what we observe is the emergence of a territorially fragmented bipolarism, in which 
competition between two coalitions is region-specific and is not framed within a ‘state– 
wide’ logic of national governing parties versus national opposition.
The return to a more bipolar type of competition was also accompanied by persisting 
high levels of volatility – measured by using the Pedersen index (see Bartolini and Mair 
1990). The 2014–2015 electoral cycle had already seen high levels of volatility, at around 
50% across the eight regions, similar to those of 1995 – when regional elections took place 
shortly after the transformation of the old, postwar party system between 1992 and 1994. 
Following the 1995 cycle, however, volatility declined, due to the relatively rapid stabi-
lization of the new party system, and in 2010 it was still well below the levels of the mid- 
1990s (around 30%). In 2020, in contrast, volatility remained very high (45%). In 
Tuscany, it even marked a record high, reaching 50% for the first time. This suggests 
that, unlike the previous systemic crisis of the mid-1990s, the political crisis that began in 
the aftermath of the Great Recession has not led to a new equilibrium. In fact, the Italian 
political landscape remains rather unstable and the socio-economic crisis resulting from 
Covid-19 is likely to create new fractures in a context of weakening party organizations 
and political allegiances (as clearly shown in the case of the red regions).
If we move from votes to elected representatives, the picture of strengthening local 
lists and weakening political parties is generally confirmed. Table 4 shows that in 2020 
local/personal lists increased their overall share of seats in regional councils by more than 
7 percentage points. It is too early to discuss the implications of this shift. To be sure, the 
increasing weight of local lists is likely to increase the autonomy of regional presidents in 
policy-making processes. Indeed, presidents will be able to establish strong direct ties 
with representatives who are not formally affiliated to any party. Probably Veneto is the 
most extreme case in this respect. In this region, President Luca Zaia would be able to 
have a majority and govern just by relying on the support of his personal list and one 
councillor from another local list (Lista Veneto Autonomia). He does not need the 
support of his own party, Salvini’s League.
Among the political parties, only FdI outperformed the overall growth of local lists, 
increasing its representation by 9.2 percentage points. Giorgia Meloni’s party fared 
particularly well in the two regions where its candidates were leading centre-right 
coalitions: the Marche and Puglia – in the latter it entered the regional council for the 
first time. The League also expanded its overall representation in regional councils, 
particularly in the South. For the first time, it won seats in Campania, Puglia and 
Calabria. On the other hand, the M5s lost all its seats in the regional council of Veneto 
and failed to gain representation in Calabria, a region where Beppe Grillo’s Movement 
had won more than 40% of the vote in the general election only two years earlier. FI’s 
electoral collapse, already observed in Table 4, meant that the number of its elected 
representatives almost halved. The decline was particularly marked in central- 
northern Italy. Today Berlusconi’s party is so weak that FI councillors play a pivotal 
role only in Calabria. In all the other regions won by the right, their votes are not 
necessary to form a majority. The PD, despite remaining the party with the largest 
regional representation, experienced a significant loss of seats (−8.6% across the eight 
regions). For the reasons mentioned above when discussing the case of Veneto, the 
weakening of the PD relative to local/personal lists is also likely to shift decision- 
making power away from the party to centre-left regional presidents. In turn, this will 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































further accelerate trends of presidentialization and territorial fragmentation that have 
been ongoing for years.
Table 4 (section B) also suggests that in 2020 most regional councils became more 
politically fragmented than at the previous election. The Laakso and Taagepera (1979) 
index, measuring the effective number of ‘parliamentary’ parties (ENPP) – that is, those 
winning representation in the regional councils –, increased in almost all regions, with 
the exception of Veneto and Puglia. The huge success of Zaia’s list can explain a certain 
level of ‘simplification’ in the first context. Puglia, in contrast, was the most fragmented 
region in 2015 and its slight decline on this indicator just points to a general convergence 
with the other regions, whose councils, on the other hand, have become more ‘plural’. 
Puglia also seems to be an outlier with regard to disproportionality – measured by 
Gallagher’s (1991) least squares index – which, as displayed in Table 4 (section C) 
declined in almost all regions. Tuscany is another exception. Unsurprisingly, dispropor-
tionality seems to be negatively associated with the number of effective parties. This 
means that, as councils become more fragmented, they also reflect more closely the actual 
preferences of the voters. Yet it should be remembered that, while Italian regions have 
adopted different voting systems, they all assign a ‘majority bonus’ to the coalition of the 
winning candidate for president. Puglia and Tuscany are more disproportional than the 
rest of the group partly because their elected presidents won a plurality rather than an 
absolute majority of the vote. Therefore, the ‘mechanical’ effect of the majority bonus on 
the disproportionality of the outcome was particularly visible in these two regions. In 
contexts like Campania, Veneto and Liguria, the electoral advantage of the winning 
coalitions was so large that the majority bonus was not triggered. No extra seats were 
needed to gain control of regional councils.2 Hence the increased proportionality 
observed in some regions is less an indicator of a general trend than it is a function of 
the unprecedented success of the winning coalitions. This success, as discussed in the 
previous section, was mainly due to the central political role played by regional leaders.
Conclusion
The 2020 regional elections took place in a critical year for Italy. Another crisis hit the 
country, although it did not originate from the usual twists and turns of Italy’s unstable 
politics or struggling economy. This time the shock was clearly exogenous and unpre-
dictable. The pandemic suspended political competition for months. The return to 
a precarious normality in the summer showed that something had in fact happened 
behind the apparent freezing of Italian politics. At the subnational level, regional 
presidents had gained new centrality during the health emergency. Given the extensive 
powers that regional governments have in the area of health care this is not so surprising. 
Yet, rather than reversing pre-crisis trends, the pandemic merely accelerated processes 
that were already visible in January, before the start of the outbreak.
This article has stressed that, in both rounds of elections in January and September, 
regional actors clearly asserted their autonomy from national politics. Each region 
followed a particular path, which was substantially shaped by the personalities of local 
leaders and candidates. Thus, in January, while in Emilia-Romagna a centre-left coalition 
led by the incumbent president decisively won in an election that the leader of the right- 
wing League had tried to nationalize, in Calabria a centre-right alliance triumphed. 
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Again, in September, voters rewarded both centre-left and centre-right candidates with 
no consistent pattern. Hence, the plebiscitary victory of centre-right Luca Zaia in Veneto 
occurred while centre-left Vincenzo de Luca beat his opponent by more than 50 percen-
tage points in Campania. Similar diverging trajectories can be observed in Liguria and 
Puglia. It is true that, overall, the right managed to flip two regions, Calabria and Marche. 
Yet these outcomes did not result from a national swing to the right. In fact, traditional 
competition between left and right seems to have lost any meaning– De Luca hardly 
campaigned on a left-wing platform, while Zaia clearly distanced himself from Salvini’s 
new turn towards Italian nationalism. In this context, even the role of national parties is 
questioned. While boosting turnout, the political revival of regional leadership did not 
appear to have a positive impact on political parties’ overall strength. On the contrary, 
regional leaders seem increasingly to rely on a number of local or personal lists, avoiding 
partisan labels, in order to reach new voters and strengthen their positions and auton-
omy. Given these shifts, one may wonder whether Italian regional politics is gradually 
heading towards a fully candidate-based, ‘party-less’ model of democracy. Analyses of 
future regional elections will undoubtedly help to address this question.
Notes
1. See http://www.demos.it/a01641.php
2. In the case of Calabria, even though the centre-right coalition won by a very large margin 
and did not need the majority bonus, the existence of a system of coalition and list thresh-
olds contributed to the disproportionality of the final outcome.
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